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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78A-4-103(2)0) (2009).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the District Court correctly determine, as a matter of law, that the State did not

breach the lease agreement between the parties, because the State had the right under the
agreement to adjust annual rents based on fair market value for the highest and best use
of the subject property? (R. 2079).
Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonprevailing party. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d 271 (Utah
2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on summary
judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust,
100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004).
II.

Did the District Court correctly determine, as a matter of law, that because the

State was entitled under the lease to adjust annual rentals to fair market rental value,
appellant Cook Associates, Inc. was not entitled to assert derivative claims for breach of
the covenants of good faith and fair dealing and quiet enjoyment, and regulatory takings,
based on the State's right to readjust lease rentals.
Standard of Review
Same as above.
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Federal Statutes
Utah Enabling Act (Act of July 16,1894, ch. 138,28 Stat 107)
Sec. 6. [Land grant for common schools.]
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections numbered two,
sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every township of said proposed state . . . are hereby
granted to said State for the support of common schools . . .
Utah Constitution
Article XX, Section 2. [School and institutional trust lands.]
Lands granted to the State under Sections 6, 8, and 12 of the Utah Enabling Act,
and other lands which may be added to those lands pursuant to those sections through
purchase, exchange, or other means, are declared to be school and institutional trust
lands, held in trust by the State for the respective beneficiaries and purposes stated in the
Enabling Act grants.
Utah Statutes
53C-1-102 Purpose.
(1) (a) The purpose of this title is to establish an administration and board to
manage lands that Congress granted to the state for the support of common schools and
other beneficiary institutions, under the Utah Enabling Act.
(b) This grant was expressly accepted in the Utah Constitution, thereby creating a
compact between the federal and state governments which imposes upon the state a
perpetual trust obligation to which standard trust principles are applied.
(c) Title to these trust lands is vested in the state as trustee to be administered for
the financial support of the trust beneficiaries.
(2) (a) The trust principles referred to in Subsection (1) impose fiduciary duties
upon the state, including a duty of undivided loyalty to, and a strict requirement to
administer the trust corpus for the exclusive benefit of, the trust beneficiaries.
(b) As trustee, the state must manage the lands and revenues generated from the
lands in the most prudent and profitable manner possible, and not for any purpose
inconsistent with the best interests of the trust beneficiaries.
(c) The trustee must be concerned with both income for the current beneficiaries
and the preservation of trust assets for future beneficiaries, which requires a balancing of
short and long-term interests so that long-term benefits are not lost in an effort to
maximize short-term gains.
2

(d) The beneficiaries do not include other governmental institutions or agencies,
the public at large, or the general welfare of this state.
(3) This title shall be liberally construed to enable the board of trustees, the
director, and the administration to faithfully fulfill the state's obligations to the trust
beneficiaries.
53C-1-302. Management of the administration — Trust responsibilities.
(1) (a) The director has broad authority to:
(i) manage the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration in fulfillment
of its purpose; and
(ii) establish fees, procedures, and rules consistent with general policies prescribed
by the board of trustees.
(b) The procedures and rules shall:
(i) be consistent with the Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution, and policies of
the board;
(ii) reflect undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries consistent with the director's
fiduciary duties and responsibilities;
(iii) subject to Subsection (2), obtain the optimum values from use of trust lands
and revenues for the trust beneficiaries, including the return of not less than fair market
value for the use, sale, or exchange of school and institutional trust assets; and
(iv) be broadly construed to grant the board, director, and administration full
discretionary authority to manage, maintain, or dispose of trust assets in the manner they
consider most favorable to the beneficiaries.
(2) The director shall seek to optimize trust land revenues consistent with the
balancing of short and long-term interests, so that long-term benefits are not lost in an
effort to maximize short-term gains.
(3) The director shall maintain the integrity of the trust and prevent, through
prudent management, the misapplication of its lands and revenues.
53C-1-304. Rules to ensure procedural due process — Board review of director
action — Judicial review.
(1) The board shall make rules to ensure procedural due process in the resolution
of complaints concerning actions by the board, director, and the administration.
(2) An aggrieved party to a final action by the director or the administration may
petition the board for administrative review of the decision.
(3) (a) The board may appoint a qualified hearing examiner for purposes of taking
evidence and making recommendations for board action.
(b) The board shall consider the recommendations of the examiner in making
decisions.
(4) (a) The board shall uphold the decision of the director or the administration
unless itfinds,by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decision violated applicable
law, policy, or rules.
3

(b) The board shall base its final actions on findings and conclusions and shall
inform the aggrieved party of its right to judicial review.
(5) An aggrieved party to a final action by the board may obtain judicial review of
that action under Sections 63G-4-402 and 63G-4-403.
63G-4-40L Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within
30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter.
Administrative Rules
Utah Admin Code R. 850-30-400 (2007).
1. Lease rates shall be based on the market value and income producing
capability of the subject property and may be determined by:
(a) multiplying the market value of the subject property by the current agencydetermined interest rate;
(b) the evaluation and use of comparable lease data; or
(c) using either a fixed rate per acre or a crop-share formula for agricultural
leases providing that the rental rate is customary and reasonable.
2. The agency may base lease rentals on a value other than the market value of
the subject property, provided that the director determines such is in the best interest
of the beneficiaries and provided that the lease contains a clause whereby the agency
may terminate the lease prior to the end of the lease term.
3. In addition to lease rental, the agency may require the payment of percentage
rents.
4. The agency, pursuant to board policy, may establish a minimum lease rental
based on the costs incurred in administering the leases, and a desired minimum rate
of return.
4

5. Lease Review Procedures and Rental Adjustments for Special Use Leases.
(a) Special use leases shall be reviewed by the agency as of the effective date
specified in the respective lease and such review may result in an adjustment of base
rental.
(b) Adjustments in base rentals may be based upon changes in market value
including appreciation of the subject properties, changes in established indices, or
other methods which may be appropriate and in the best interest of the trust
beneficiaries. The determination of which method to use may be based upon an
analysis of the cost effectiveness of performing the review.
(c) When using established indices, the rate of adjustment shall be based on the
indices established for the years involved in the review period, unless the rate of
adjustment exceeds a maximum adjustment rate, or fails to reach a minimum rate of
adjustment as specified in the respective lease. If no maximum adjustment rate or
minimum rate of increase is specified in the lease, then the percent change will
increase or decrease according to the above described rate of adjustment.
(d) The index used in the review may be the applicable component of the CPI-U
or any other index determined by the agency to be appropriate.
(e) The adjusted rental amount as determined pursuant to this rule shall be
rounded to the nearest number evenly divisible by $10.
(f) The director may suspend, defer, or waive the adjustment of base rentals in
specific instances, based on a written finding that the suspension, deferral, or waiver
is in the best interest of the trust beneficiaries.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves interpretation of a contract provision that allows the State to
make periodic adjustments of annual rentals under a ground lease of state school trust
lands entered between the State, acting through the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration ("SITLA") as lessor, and appellant Cook Associates, Inc., dba Cook
Slurry Company, a Utah corporation ("Cook"), as lessee.
On June 13, 1978, the State of Utah, acting through the Division of State Lands &
Forestry ("DSL&F"), and Cook executed Special Use Lease Agreement ("SULA") 418, a
ground lease of state school trust lands near Lehi, Utah County (the "Lease"). The lease
authorized Cook to use the leased premises for an explosives manufacturing plant. In
5

1994, SITLA succeeded DSL&F as statutory manager of Utah's state trust lands and as
Lessor under the Lease.
Paragraph 11 of the Lease contains the following provision concerning periodic
adjustment of lease rentals:
Lessee agrees that Lessor shall have the right to adjust the
annual rentals hereunder at the end of each five (5) year
period as Lessor shall deem to be reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the State.
SITLA's periodic readjustments of special use lease rentals are governed by Utah Admin.
Code R. 850-30-400(5) (2009). This rule provides for rental adjustments based upon
changes in the fair market value of the leased property, including appreciation in property
values or changes in established price indices.
Pursuant to Paragraph 11, the State timely exercised its option to adjust Cook's
rent in 1993 and 1998 based on changes in the consumer price index. SITLA attempted
to readjust rentals a third time in 2004, this time based upon a new independent appraisal
demonstrating a large increase in the underlying land value of the leased lands. However,
no change in the rent amount was implemented at that time because Cook
administratively challenged the timeliness of SITLA's exercise of Paragraph 11. After
formal adjudicative proceedings before the SITLA Board of Trustees, the Board
determined that SITLA's verbal communications with Cook regarding the proposed rent
adjustment did not comprise timely notice to Cook of the rental adjustment (which had
been due in 2003), and reversed the adjustment (R. 0298-0319).
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In both the interval prior to the proposed 2003 rental adjustment and subsequently,
land values in northern Utah County increased dramatically. The independent appraisal
of the property in connection with the proposed 2004 adjustment indicated the substantial
encroachment of suburban development to the boundaries of the property, with values
rising accordingly. During this period, SITLA and Cook disagreed on the interpretation
of Paragraph 11 and the associated administrative rules governing rent adjustments.
SITLA contended that R. 850-30-400 and Paragraph 11 allowed it to consider the highest
and best use of the property in setting adjusted rentals. Cook asserted to the contrary that
"SITLA is required to determine the FMV of the property for purposes of any rent
increase by reference to the leasehold used for the next 20 years as an explosives facility"
(R. 0004).
Cook initiated litigation against SITLA in the Fourth District Court on October 30,
2006, alleging four causes of action (R. 001-008). Cook's claims stemmed from
SITLA's purported intent to timely exercise Paragraph 11 at the next option period
(2008) in accordance with the fair market value of the land under Lease (R. 001-008);
however, Cook did not file an administrative action in 2008 to appeal the actual rental
adjustment. In the subject litigation, Cook asserted causes of action for breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment and inverse condemnation as a result of SITLA's past attempt and future
intent to exercise Paragraph 11 (R. 0004-0006). Cook alleged that certain acts of SITLA,
which purportedly occurred between 2002 and October 2006, constituted bad acts and
contributed to the breaches and/or taking. These "bad acts" included: (1) the alleged
7

attempt to either sell or develop, subject to the Lease, the school trust lands under Lease;
(2) the alleged "slander" of Cook in the business community; (3) purported "threats" to
Cook concerning an imminent rent increase; and (4) the refusal to accept Cook's proposal
to participate in the sale or development of the land under Lease and subsequently split
the profits associated with the disposition of school trust lands. (R. 0005-0007, 04760480).
Upon completion of discovery, SITLA moved the District Court for summary
judgment on March 25, 2008 (R. 0210-0550). SITLA asserted that the terms of
Paragraph 11 unambiguously granted SITLA the option to adjust rents as SITLA deems
will serve the best interest of the State. As it pertains to management of school trust
lands, the best interest of the State is governed by the Utah Constitution, the Utah Trust
Lands Management Act, and applicable administrative rules. SITLA's contended that its
exercise of Paragraph 11 to raise rents to reflect the appraised fair market rental value of
the underlying lands, in the manner set forth by applicable rules, was a lawful exercise of
a bargained-for contractual right, and could not support Cook's claims of breach of
contract.
On May 5, 2008, Cook also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 12121266). Cook's motion did not contend that there were any material facts in dispute which
would have precluded the grant of summary judgment to the State. Rather, Cook
attempted to introduce various new claims, based upon a variety of inadmissible
evidence, all appearing for the first time notwithstanding the close of discovery some
months before (R. 1428-1537). SITLA moved to strike various inadmissible evidence.
8

See Defendant's Motions to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Merrill Cook (R. 13401362); also see Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Dee G. Atkin and
Thaddeus Speed (R. 1366-1420).
After oral argument on the pending motions, the District Court ruled on January
22, 2009 that the contract between the parties unambiguously gave the State the right to
readjust rentals based on the highest and best use of the property. The Court found that,
because the contract granted the right to readjust, Cook's derivative claims of breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
anticipatory breach, and inverse condemnation could not be maintained (R. 2076-2083).
The Court then found that the remaining motions concerning admissibility of various
Cook affidavits were moot. The Court entered a final order on March 17, 2009, granting
summary judgment to the SITLA and denying Cook's reciprocal motion for summary
judgment (R. 2149-2154). Cook filed a timely Notice of Appeal, dated April 1, 2009 (R.
2155-2157).
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS RELEVANT TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SITLA and the School Trust
1.

The School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") is an

independent state agency created by Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-101 e/ seq. to administer
lands granted by the United States to the State of Utah by the Utah Enabling Act, Act of
July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, for the express purposes enumerated in the Enabling Act.
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2.

At statehood, the Enabling Act granted certain lands to the State with the

condition that all revenue flowing from such trust lands be used for the support of the
State's public schools and other beneficiary institutions. Utah Enabling Act, Act of July
16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107 at Sec. 6, 8, 10 and 12.
3.

The Utah Constitution imposes the duty of trustee on the State, acting by

and through SITLA, in administering state trust lands. UT Const., art. X, §§5 and 7, and
art. XX, §2.
4.

The Utah Legislature has granted SITLA authority to exercise discretion to

manage state trust lands and promulgate rules in fulfillment of its purposes. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 53C-l-102(2)(b) (1994), 53C-4-101 (1997), and 53C-l-302(l)-(2) (1997).
The Subject Property
5.

The state school trust lands which are the subject of this action (the

"Subject Property") are located in Utah County and more fully described as:
Township 6 South, Range 1 West, SLB&M
Section 11: N2, W2SW4, N2SE4
(R. 0544).
6.

SITLA manages the Subject Property on behalf of the State pursuant to the

Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution, Utah statutes, and applicable regulations, for
the benefit of the trust beneficiaries, in this case Utah's K-12 public schools (R. 0544).
The Lease
7.

Cook and the State entered into Special Use Lease Agreement No. 418 on

June 13, 1978 ("1978 Lease"). The 1978 Lease was amended in 1988 to include a 475
acres comprising a buffer zone already in place ("1988 Amendment"). The 1978 Lease
10

and 1988 Amendment are hereafter collectively referred to as the "Lease" (R. 04630469).
The Rental Adjustment Clause
8.

Paragraph 11 of the Lease states:
Lessee agrees that Lessor shall have the right to adjust the
annual rentals hereunder at the end of each five (5) year
period as Lessor shall deem to be reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the State.

(R. 0468).
Administrative Rule Governing Lease Review
9.

Utah Admin. Code R. 850-30-400 (2007), which governs special use lease

rates and establishes the acceptable methodology by which SITLA calculates rental
adjustments, provides in relevant part:
Lease Review Procedures and Rental Adjustments for Special Use Leases.
(a) Special use leases shall be reviewed by the agency
as of the effective date specified in the respective lease and
such review may result in an adjustment of base rental.
(b) Adjustments in base rentals may be based upon
changes in market value including appreciation of the subject
properties, changes in established indices, or other methods
which may be appropriate and in the best interest of the trust
beneficiaries. The determination of which method to use may
be based upon an analysis of the cost effectiveness of
performing the review.
(R. 0544-0545).
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2004: No Rental Adjustment
10.

Cook appealed the timeliness of SITLA's action of May 27, 2004, to

exercise its 2003 option pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the Lease and adjust rental rates (R.
0320-0326).
11.

SITLA's Board of Trustees concluded that "Cook was not given the

required notice by the relevant anniversary date" and that SITLA "was required to
exercise its option to adjust the SULA 418 rents in a timely fashion, or this right was
waived." As such, no rental adjustment was implemented in 2004 (R. 0298-0319).
2006: Cook Lawsuit Against SITLA
12.

On July 20, 2005, Mr. Thomas A. Mitchell, counsel for SITLA, sent

correspondence to Mr. Blake S. Atkin, counsel for Cook, regarding SITLA's future intent
to conduct a review of the rental rate pursuant to its option under Paragraph 11 of the
Lease "to adjust the rent to provide for a return to the trust of an amount equal to market
value as of the date of the five-year review . . . [and SITLA's willingness] to discuss
alternatives along the lines proposed in the past" (R. 0295).
13.

Cook filed the Complaint on October 30, 2006, claiming breach of Lease

and inverse condemnation, and seeking declaratory judgment of SITLA's rights to
determine fair market value pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the Lease, based on Cook's
limited leasehold interest (R. 001-008).
14.

SITLA objects to Paragraphs 6, 18, and 19 of Appellant's Statement of

Undisputed Facts because they were disputed and subject to Motions to Strike which
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Motions were rendered moot by the District Court's Decision on appeal (R. 1340-1362,
R. 1366-1420).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court correctly held as a matter of law that Paragraph 11 of the Lease
unambiguously granted the State of Utah, through SITLA, the right to adjust rentals
under the lease as it deemed reasonably necessary, to reflect the full fair market rental
value of the subject property. Because SITLA was contractually entitled to raise rent to
reflect the increase in market value of the land, Cook's derivative claims that the
proposed adjustment constituted an anticipatory repudiation of the lease, a breach of the
covenants of good faith and fair dealing or quiet enjoyment, or some sort of regulatory
taking all fail as a matter of law. Utah law governing the interpretation of contracts, as
set forth m Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f31, 190 P. 3d 1269, 1277 (Utah 2008),
provides that a party's competing interpretation of contractual language may be accepted
only if that interpretation is reasonably supported by the language of the contract. Cook
asserts parol evidence to argue a position not reasonably supported by the language of the
contract, i.e. that the State's right to readjust is limited to the value of Cook's use of the
property for an explosives plant and buffer zone, rather than its highest and best use (in
this case for residential subdivision development). There is nothing in the lease language
that supports Cook's position, so the District Court correctly ruled in SITLA's favor as a
matter of law.
The parol evidence relied upon by Cook is also clearly inadmissible. Cook's
appeal relies on three affidavits submitted at the last moment to the District Court.
13

SITLA moved to strike the affidavits (R. 1340-1362, 1366-1420) because they were
either hearsay, or involved factual claims that had not been identified in Cook's initial
disclosures or discovery responses. The District Court correctly ignored the affidavits,
finding that the dispositive question was one of law - whether SITLA was entitled,
pursuant to the plain meaning of Paragraph 11, to adjust Lease rent based on the fair
market value of the land under Lease. The Court found that Paragraph 11 was facially
unambiguous, allowing it to disregard as moot Cook's claims of parol evidence to the
contrary. It therefore found SITLA's motions to strike moot (R. 2077).
SITLA is at something of a loss in responding to Cook's various theories of the
case, since Cook's arguments have radically changed from pleading to pleading over the
course of the case. Cook's Docketing Statement and Brief state that the only issue on
appeal is whether "the trial court err[ed] in detennining that as a matter of law SITLA did
not commit an anticipatory breach of its 49 year lease with Cook Associates." Cook
Brief at p. vii. Anticipatory repudiation was never pleaded in the complaint in this action,
although Cook included the claim in its Motion for Summary Judgment. The District
Court ruled on the claim because it, like other claims Cook did assert in its complaint, the
claim was derivative of the core legal issue - the manner in which SITLA may adjust rent
pursuant to Paragraph 11.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that anticipatory breach occurs when a party to
an executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent to not render its
promised performance when the time fixed for it in the contract arrives. Hurwitz v.
David K. Richards Co., 436 P.2d 794, 796 (Utah 1968). Cook alleges a variety of
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alleged bad acts by SITLA that it claims constitute anticipatory repudiation; e.g. that
SITLA indicated that it would be raising rent to reflect current fair market value (that
admittedly would raise rents greatly, given the huge increase in land values in northern
Utah County since 1978 as the area urbanized), told potential investors that the lease
would likely terminate for this reason, and began marketing the lands for development in
anticipation of such termination.
Although SITLA would hotly dispute Cook's allegations concerning these issues
were the case to be tried, for purposes of summary judgment they can be accepted
arguendo. Even so, SITLA is entitled to summary judgment. In its Order, the District
Court stated: "Cook's claim for anticipatory repudiation fails because the Court finds that
under the Lease, the rental rate is to be adjusted on the basis of fair market value, without
regard to Cook's use of the land" (R. 2150), and "The Court declares the proper
interpretation of the rental price to be that of the fair market value of the property without
regard to an underlying leasehold interest. That being a proper lease right, the Court
dismisses Plaintiffs claim for anticipatory repudiation" (R. 2078). The Court's
determination was correct as a matter of law, because SITLA was acting within the lease,
which granted a right of rental adjustment as the State saw reasonably fit. In this case,
SITLA did not contravene its promised performance, a prerequisite of anticipatory or
other breach. The District Court similarly and correctly disposed of Cook's other
derivative claims for breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing and quiet
enjoyment on the same basis - SITLA was acting within the contract when it indicated to
Cook that it would readjust the Lease based on market value.
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Finally, the Court of Appeals should note undisputed evidence that Cook's
allegations that Cook's operations were disrupted by SITLA's actions to adjust lease
rentals, in violation of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, are unsupportable. Well
prior to the supposed "bad acts" of SITLA, the undisputed facts show that Cook's
business on the site had entirely ceased, and Cook had filed what was determined to be a
no-asset bankruptcy. In these circumstances, SITLA could not be found, as a matter of
law, to have interfered with Cook's enjoyment of the premises or have "taken" any right
thereto.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SITLA IS ENTITLED,
UPON EXERCISE OF THE RENTAL ADJUSTMENT OPTION PROVIDED FOR
IN PARAGRAPH 11, TO OBTAIN A "FAIR MARKET VALUE" RETURN ON
THE LAND SUBJECT TO THE LEASE,
A.

Cook's Interpretation of the Lease Is Not Supported By the Lease Language.
The core argument advanced by Cook is that Paragraph 11 of the lease, which

allows periodic rental adjustments as "reasonably necessary in the best interests of the
State", constrains the rental value of the land to, variously, Cook's actual uses of the land
leased; the value by which Cook as lessee is benefited under the Lease; or the State's
administrative costs. The problem with Cook's argument is that it has no basis in the
actual language used in the Lease. Under established principles of contract interpretation,
a party's competing interpretation of contractual language may be accepted only if that
interpretation is reasonably supported by the language of the contract. Dairies v. Vincent,
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2008 UT 51, p i , 190 P. 3d 1269, 1277 (Utah 2008), citing Ward v. Intermountain
Farmer's Ass 'n, 907 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1995). If the contract is in writing and the language
is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the
agreement. Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Public Service Commission and Qwest
Corporation, 163 P.3d 652, 655 (Utah App. 2007); also See Rainford v. Rytting, 451 P.2d
769 (Utah 1969). There can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered to obscure
otherwise plain contractual terms. Id. Nor can language be deemed ambiguous simply
because the parties have a different interpretation; the claim must be "plausible and
reasonable in light of the language used." Id., citing First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B.
Ranch, Inc., 966 P. 2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998). A contract provision is not ambiguous just
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does.
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
The District Court correctly approached the issue of lease interpretation. It found
no support in the language of the contract that would limit adjusted rents to the value of
the lands as used by Cook, rather than full fair market value (R. 2079). Paragraph 11
clearly allows the State to readjust as "Lessor shall deem" reasonably necessary in the
best interests of the State. The adjustment provision was not facially ambiguous, and the
Court found as a matter of law that a proposed adjustment on the basis of fair market
value would not constitute a breach of the contract. Id.
B.

Cook's Unreasonableness Argument Should Not Be Considered.
Cook argues that the substantial increase in rentals that would have occurred in

connection with the 2008 readjustment violated Paragraph 11 because it was
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unreasonable and not in the best interests of the State to adopt an interpretation that
would render his lease meaningless through the State's ability to raise rents at will. Cook
Brief at 12-14. An initial problem with this argument is Cook chose to pursue a legal
remedy that precluded use of established administrative remedies to address his claims.
After SITLA chose to adjust rentals under Paragraph 11 in 2004, Cook appealed
administratively to the SITLA Board of Trustees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 53C-1-304,
challenging the timeliness of SITLA's decision to adjust, which under the five year
readjustment provision had vested in 2003 (R.0322-0325). Cook prevailed in this appeal,
meaning that under Paragraph 11 SITLA was not entitled to adjust rentals again until
2008. Rather than paying rent at the prevailing low rate until then, and appealing the
reasonableness of any adjustment at that time, Cook filed this litigation in 2006 - several
years in advance of the adjustment - claiming that SITLA's statements of intent to
readjust the lease to market value in 2008 were in themselves a breach of the Lease
(although, interestingly, he did not argue anticipatory breach at that time). The actual
adjustment in 2008 took place after the pleadings had been closed in this litigation. Cook
failed either to appeal that decision administratively or pay the revised rent, with the
result that the Lease subsequently terminated. Had Cook appealed, it would have been
free to argue the reasonableness of any adjustment, in accordance with the specific
language of Paragraph 11. It chose not to do so. The Court of Appeals need not consider
Cook's arguments concerning the reasonableness of the proposed increase, since Cook
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies in this regard. See Utah Code
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Ann. § 63G-4-401 (2008) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite of
judicial review).
C.

Adjustment of the Lease Rental Was Contemplated by the Lease and Legally

Permissible,
The fact that readjustment could be based on changes in market value after the
lease was executed does not make such an adjustment invalid. Even if a contractual
provision is not "immediately capable of definitive determination," that does not
necessarily make the provision unenforceable." Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Div, of
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). In that case, a state mineral
lease allowed adjustment of mineral royalty rates based on subsequent changes in federal
royalty rates applicable to comparable federal lands. The Utah Supreme Court allowed
enforcement of the provision, since setting future payments based on "market value" was
a practicable method of setting value.
In this case, there is a well-defined, practicable method for setting the amount of
adjusted rentals. The State has a statutory and constitutional mandate to obtain not less
than fair market value for the use of school trust assets. Utah Code Ann. §53C-1-302(2)
(1997). For leases of state trust lands, this statutory directive is implemented by Utah
Admin. Code R. 850-30-400. This rule requires lease rates to be based on fair market
value, as determined by the agency based on return on land value or comparable lease
data. R. 850-30-400(1). The rule also requires periodic review of the lease rentals, and
provides direction as to how adjustments are calculated. Utah Admin. Code R. 850-30400(5) provides:
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(b) Adjustments in base rentals may be based upon changes in
market value including appreciation of the subject properties,
changes in established indices, or other methods which may be
appropriate and in the best interest of the trust beneficiaries.
Any decision to adjust rentals under the rule is subject to administrative appeal and
subsequent judicial review by the lessee pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-304(2)
(2006), although as noted above Cook did not pursue this remedy.
Cook argues that R. 850-30-400(5) may not be applied to the Lease because it was
not enacted at the time that the Lease was originally entered in 1978. As an initial matter,
this argument does not affect the right of the State to make periodic discretionary
adjustments in the lease rentals under Paragraph 11; the Lease unquestionably authorizes
these adjustments, while the rule clarifies how they are to be implemented. At all
relevant times, the State through its designee (DSL&F, now SITLA) has had: "full power
and authority to prescribe necessary rules and regulations to accomplish its purposes and
objectives as set out by statute . .." McKnight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 731
(Utah 1963). The administrative rules of SITLA and DSL&F have made "market value"
the touchstone of lease rentals and adjustments. Cf. Utah Admin. Code R632-30-4 (1990)
("The division shall receive at least fair market value for surface leases"); Utah Admin.
Code R. 850-30-400 (2007) ("Adjustments in base rentals may be based in changes in
market value including appreciation of the subject properties..."). The administrative
code constrains the agency's discretion in making the determination of fair market value.
It may use an index created by the agency to measure inflation in land values. Id. It may
also consider appreciation through appraising the underlying land, and applying a rate of
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return based on the prime rate. Id. Rule R. 850-30-400(5)(b) specifically provides that
the method of determining the adjustment "may be based upon...the cost effectiveness of
performing the review." Id.
The State's obligation to manage school trust lands and derive full benefit to the
trust existed long before the execution of the Lease in 1978. In 1965, the Utah Supreme
Court emphasized that the State, through its agencies and officers, must manage the state
trust lands in the most "prudent and profitable manner possible." Colman v. Utah State
LandBd., 403 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 1965). As such, Cook entered into the Lease with
DSL&F with notice of, and subject to, the law governing school trust lands. Cook cannot
now claim that the Lease is not subject to the laws in existence at the time the Lease was
created.
This interpretation is consistent with case law from other states construing rental
readjustment clauses. In Bullock's, Inc. v. Security-First Natl Bank, 325 P.2d 185 (Cal.
App. 1958), a declaratory relief action to determine the value of property for the purpose
of setting new adjusted rental payments, the word "value" as used in the lease was held to
mean the property's worth based on highest and best use rather than its utility for the use
as leased. Cases which value the lease itself are clearly distinguishable. As the Court in
Bullock ys, Inc. points out:
The rule contended for is wholly impractical, for the reason
that, as long as the net annual rent is unknown, the net value
of the reversion cannot be ascertained, one of the necessary
elements for fixing such value being lacking. No such plan for
fixing the rentals could have been anticipated by the parties.
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325 P.2d at 287 (emphasis added). This, of course, is why Cook can articulate no basis
for any rental adjustment beyond the "4-5000" amount paid by Cook for the last twenty
years (R. 0289). The value of the leasehold estate is a function of the rent, not the other
way around.
In Eltinge and Graziadio Development Co. v. Childs, 49 Cal. App. 3d 294 (Cal
App.1975), also a declaratory action to interpret a rental readjustment clause in a ground
lease, the court held that the lease when read as a whole was intended to return to the
lessors a fixed percentage return on the value of the land appraised as to its "highest and
best use" or "market worth," and not "value in use." Id.
In this case, there is no question that the parties agree that "fair market value" is
intended. Cook conceded in the 2004 administrative proceeding that the State was
entitled to market value (R. 0456-0458). The question is whether "fair market value"
represents the "value in use" by Cook or the "highest and best use" of the trust asset. The
Lease does not contain any provision for value in use, but rather references the "best
interest of the State". Since Utah law requires the State to seek " . . . the greatest possible
monetary return for the school and institutional trusts", National Parks and Conservation
Association v. State Lands Board, 869 P.2d 909, 922 (Utah 1993), it is reasonable to
assume that SITLA is entitle to adjust rents to reflect the actual, unencumbered fair
market value of the lands.
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II.
INADMISSIBLE PAROL EVIDENCE AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL
REMAINS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE ON APPEAL
In connection with the parties' cross-motions for Summary Judgment, Cook
submitted affidavits from Dee Atkin and Thaddeus Speed purporting to show that SITLA
employees had stated to third parties that rent on the subject property would be increased
at the next periodic adjustment to the point that Cook's business would be unviable, and
that no further investment should be made into the premises. Cook Brief, Statement of
Factsfflf6, 18, 19, 26. The affidavits were filed after the close of discovery, during
which Cook had failed to identify either Messrs. Speed or Atkin as potential fact
witnesses (R. 1366-1420). At the same (late) date, Cook also submitted an affidavit from
Merrill Cook alleging that a now long-dead state employee had told him at lease
inception in 1978 that rents would never be increased disproportionately to increases in
DSL&F's overhead. The relevant portions of Merrill Cook's affidavit were comprised
purely of hearsay (R. 1340-1362). SITLA moved to strike the inadmissible evidence (R.
1340-1362, 1366-1420). The District Court, finding that SITLA had properly exercised
its rights under the Lease to raise rents to market value, determined that SITLA's
Motions to Strike were moot (R. 2077). However, Cook now incorporates the
inadmissible evidence in its Brief as if such evidence had been properly admitted from
the outset.
As detailed in SITLA's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike
the Affidavits of Dee G. Atkin and Thaddeus Speed, dated May 22, 2008, Cook failed to
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disclose, as required by Rules 26(a), 26(e), and 33 Utah R. Civ. P., the identities of Mr.
Atkin and Mr. Speed despite numerous discovery requests and efforts on the part of
SITLA to obtain their identities and the information contained in the affidavits, either in
the pre-trial disclosures or during the discovery period (R. 1366-1420). Cook did not
defend this attempt to insert inadmissible evidence by showing good cause or harmless
error for the failure to disclose, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (R. 1664-1730, 17311785, 1975-2052).
While the District Court ruled the Motions to Strike were moot, its determination
does not transform inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence available to Cook on
appeal. Facts comprising inadmissible evidence in the District Court are also
inadmissible in an appeal reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment. See
Pipkin v. Haugen, 2003 UT App 216 (Utah App.) (affirming the district court's grant of
summary judgment where opposing party's affidavit did not provide facts supported by
admissible evidence.); also see Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).
Cook's Brief is peppered with the inadmissible evidence and unsupported facts or
innuendo alluding to the existence of such facts. See Cook Brief at pp. 1, 12, 19 and 23;
also see Facts 6, 18 and 19. The inadmissible evidence is neither material nor relevant to
the issue of law decided by the District Court. Cook's insertion of such facts to rewrite
the record before the District Court or to create a new cause of action should be
disregarded. Also see Peterson v. Coca Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ^[20, 48 P.3d 941
(upholding trial court's grant of summary judgment where opposing party "offered
nothing more than unsupported allegations.") (quoting Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934,
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936 (Utah 1979)). "The court must view all facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, but it may not assume facts for which no evidence is
offeredr Peterson, 2002 UT at ^20, 48 P.3d 941 (emphasis added) (holding that
"Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing summary
judgment") (quoting Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227-228 (1983)). The "facts"
raised by these affidavits may properly be disregarded by the Court of Appeals.

III.
COOK'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW, BECAUSE SITLA
WAS ENTITLED TO ADJUST MARKET RENTALS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE.

A.

The "Bad Acts" Alleged by Cook Are Not Legally Relevant
Cook's brief includes allegations of a variety of acts by SITLA employees that

Cook claims constitute evidence of bad faith by SITLA employees that collectively
breached the contractual covenants of good faith and fair dealing. These include the
allegations described in Section II above that SITLA staff purportedly told investors that
they intended to raise rents sufficiently to get Cook off the property; that SITLA
commissioned development plans for the property and marketed it to outside investors;
that SITLA did not allow Cook to share in development proceeds from the lands; and that
SITLA informed Cook in advance of its intent to raise the rent to much higher levels. As
discussed in Section II above, these "facts" are largely inadmissible hearsay, and need not
be considered by the Court of Appeals in determining if summary judgment was
appropriate. Yet even were the Court to accept these allegations as true, the State would
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still be entitled to summary judgment, because the legal elements necessary to show a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing have not been demonstrated.
B. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Cannot Be Used to Supersede the
Express Language of the Contract
Parties to a contract are deemed to intend that the contractual terms be construed
in a manner which assumes the parties intended that the duties and rights created by the
contract should be performed and executed in good faith. Such a covenant cannot be
construed, however, to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the
parties. Nor can a covenant of good faith be used to nullify a right granted by contract to
one of the parties or to require a party vested with a contract right to exercise that right in
a manner contrary to that party's legitimate self-interest. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812
P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991), discussing Rio Algom Corp. v. JIMCO, 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah
1980). The implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not create
any rights or duties inconsistent with the express terms of the contract. Oakwood Village
LLC v. Albertsons, 104 P.3d 1226, 1240 (Utah 2004). The implied covenant of good
faith cannot be used to create a new provision that was not previously agreed upon.
Under Paragraph 11 of the Lease, SITLA had the right to raise rents to reflect
current market values, to the extent that it deemed it necessary in the reasonable interests
of the State. To the extent Cook asserted SITLA breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing due to SITLA's intent to exercise its option pursuant to Paragraph 11 and
adjust the rent based on a determination of fair market value, such intent is not a breach
of any provision of the Lease (R. 0274-0277). Rather, this act represents the intent to
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exercise a Lease term. A contractual party cannot assert breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in order to "nullify a right granted by contract to one of the
parties . . . " Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55. There is no Lease provision that authorizes any
other manner of rental adjustment. Even if, as alleged by Cook, there were statements of
"mutual agreement to raise rent at 5-year intervals . . . to cover the additional cost of
administration spread over all Trust Land lease," the statue of frauds will not allow the
agreement to be orally modified (R. 0274-0277). As such, the District Court correctly
concluded that SITLA's intent to exercise a contract right cannot create a breach of good
faith; such claim fails to state a cause of action.
There is no question that readjustment based on fair market value in 2008 would
have led to an extremely large increase in rentals under the lease, due to the equally
substantial, indeed exponential, increase in land values in the Lehi area as the area
transformed from a distant rural location in 1978 to the urban/suburban community that it
is today. This indeed was the purpose of Paragraph 11 - to allow the school trust to
receive ongoing fair market value for its lands through periodic rental adjustments as its
lands increased in value. It was not bad faith for SITLA to state the obvious — that
market rentals would be increasing, and that this would likely preclude continuation of
the lease as a practical matter. Nor under this circumstance would exploring future
options for the marketing and development of the property after the likely tennination of
the lease. Finally, Cook had no contractual right to share in the appreciation of the
property or its post-lease development, although this was what he sought from SITLA
during the relevant period (R. 0290). SITLA's refusal to accept such a proposal does not
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breach any contractual right and thus, no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has
been breached. "[W]e will not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves." Brown
v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998).

IV.
THE COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT WAS NOT BREACHED
A.

The Elements of a Breach Were Not Present Because Cook Was Not

Constructively Evicted.
Cook's brief argues that SITLA breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment inherent
in the lease by purportedly engaging in preemptive marketing of the property, and refusing
to confirm to investors the terms that Cook ascribes to the lease (e.g. no rental adjustments
based on market value would be made). Cook Brief at 10. In the District Court, Cook
asserted that the acts constituting SITLA's breach of this covenant included: (1) Cook's
successful 2004 appeal of agency action concerning timeliness of notice to exercise the
rental readjustment clause (R. 0298-0319); (2) the agency's counsel's letter of July 2005,
informing Cook of SITLA's future intent to exercise its option to readjust ground rent to fair
market value (R. 0295); and (3) the agency's alleged attempt or attempts to negotiate a sale
of the Subject Property subject to the Lease (R. 0291). Cook asserted that the acts
constituted "non-stop harassment in trying to get Cook off the property and is thus an
actionable interference with Cook's quiet enjoyment of the property" (R. 0277). Although
Cook was unable to provide any facts to support these conclusions, for the purpose of its
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Summary Judgment motion, SITLA assumed arguendo that: (1) Cook's allegations
constituted facts and (2) these facts are true (R. 0221-0250 and 0253-0285).
Even so, SITLA was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. In order to
show a breach of the covenant, the landlord's wrongful conduct must be shown to have
created a substantial and permanent "constructive eviction." This requires that the
interference with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises must be so injurious that the
premises become entirely unfit for the demised purpose. See Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d
647 (Utah 1982); Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953);
Barker v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 178 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1947); Tregoning v. Reynolds, 28
P.2d 79 (Cal. App. 1934); Shindler v. Grove Hall Kosher Delicatessen & Lunch, Inc., 184
N.E. 673 (Mass. 1933); see also 2 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property Sec. 232(1)
(1994). Most importantly, and dispositive of this case, Cook did not abandon the premises.
Abandonment is an essential element of the cause of action. See Richard Barton
Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996).
The case of Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Group, Inc., 139 P.3d 267 (Utah App 2006)
is illustrative of the high level of interference necessary to support a claim of breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment. The tenant was subject to ongoing ethnic prejudice against
Latinos at their business of providing language training to Latino members of the LDS
Church. The trial court found that there had been verbal harassment of both the tenants and
their customers which had culminated in a call to the police reporting underage drinking at a
tenant sponsored function where the invited guests included members of the BYU faculty,
Governor Leavitt, and other dignitaries. The call to the police was made despite assurances
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that the fiesta was a non-alcohol event. The tenant's customers, of whom 90% were LDS,
were embarrassed and traumatized by the wrongfully motivated harassment to the point of
making the tenant's business commercially unfeasible; this resulted in the tenant shutting its
doors and vacating the demised premises shortly thereafter. Nothing remotely approaching
this type of conduct is alleged in this case, particularly since SITLA acted within the scope
and intent of the Lease.
B.

The Undisputed Evidence Before the District Court Showed that Cook's

Failure Was Entirely Unrelated to the State's Actions,
As noted above, SITLA's actions in connection with the Cook lease were undertaken
in compliance with the terms of the lease, and the obvious recognition that the highest and
best use of the property had changed over the years. While SITLA makes a convenient
whipping boy, the undisputed facts before the District Court do not remotely support a
claim that SITLA substantially interfered with Cook's quiet enjoyment of the Subject
Property, resulting in constructive eviction. When premises are leased for a commercial
purpose, the lessor may demonstrate that interference was not substantial by demonstrating
that the lessee's normal business operations were not unduly affected. See Joseph v. Hustad
Corp., 454 P.2d 916 (Mont. 1969). SITLA's "bad acts" allegedly occurred between 2004
and 2005. By this point in time, Cook's ship had been sunk by causes totally unrelated to
SITLA. Cook's business had failed due to industry competition, its financing had been
withdrawn, litigation against third party creditors had failed, it had filed for bankruptcy, and
the bankruptcy had been dismissed on the basis that Cook had no assets (R. 0537-0543).
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Under these circumstances, no credible claim that SITLA's actions constructively evicted
Cook is sustainable.
Cook claimed in the District Court that the company was unable to obtain financing
or attract new customers as a result of the SITLA's statements in 2002, and from 2004
through 2006, to others regarding Cook's status on the Subject Property (R. 0274, 02770278). Even assuming arguendo these hearsay assertions are admissible and true, there was
no change in the business practices or income at the Lehi plant located on the Subject
Property during this time (R. 0281-0283). The company last applied for and was rejected
for a loan in 2002, prior to any of the alleged acts (R. 0215-0218, 0281 -0282). The Lehi
plant employed fewer than 5 full time employees per year since 1985, with the exception of
1995 during which the plant employed 6 full time employees (R. 0281-0282). Since 1985,
the Lehi plant has netted an annual profit of over $10,000 on only three occasions and
suffered losses on nine occasions. Cook attributed these losses as "[mjostly a result of mine
shutdowns and mine slowdowns. The slowdown in the Wyoming and other intermountain
states' coal mines from 1983-1985 is well documented" (R. 0243-0244). Cook again
pointed to a struggling mining industry to largely explain the company's loss of its repeatcustomers (R. 0235-0238, 0242-0244). Other notable reasons for this loss of customer base
included aggressive competitors and closures of the Lehi plant. "Dyno and Orica became
very aggressive in buying distributors that were buying Cook products. Dyno and Orica
then forced them to stop buying from Cook" (R. 0235-0238, 0242-0244). Finally, the
closure in 1999 of Cook's Gilbert plant, which serviced the company's "two largest
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customers (LTV Steel Mining and Hibbing Taconite)," contributed to the failure of the
business:
In 1999, Cook lost out in a single source bid sent out by the
Cleveland Cliffs Corporation when a new purchasing VP was
hired in Cleveland. In spite of twenty years of excellent
product and service amounting to over 50 million pounds sold
to Cleveland Cliffs' mines in Minnesota, Cook lost out to
Dyno's Minnex subsidiary. There had been an issue in 1999
with one poor loading at the LTV Steel Mining Company (out
of hundreds of loadings) which Cook attributes to low PH
[sic] off spec ammonium nitrate delivered by Potash Corp of
Saskatchewan (PCS).
(R. 0235-0238, 0242-0244).
In 2001, Cook unsuccessfully sued PCS Sales, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Utah (R. 0377-0400). In the court's Memorandum of Opinion Granting
PCS's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court cited a business communication from
Cook to PCS dated April 6, 1999, wherein Cook stated the following:
(1) Due to "predatory pricing practices on the part of competitors and
overvaluation of raw material prices on the part of suppliers," Cook "has been
forced to close its doors;"
(2) Cook "is unable to pay 100% of what it currently owes its creditors;" and
(3) Cook is "forced to settle with those it owes money at less than the credited
amounts."
(R. 0397). After Cook lost to PCS, Cook filed for bankruptcy in 2003 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, District of Minnesota, pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the U.S.
Code (R. 0339-0374). The bankruptcy court dismissed the case, finding in favor of the
U.S. Trustee, who concluded that Cook "has no ability to pay its administrative expenses
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in this case" and "[t]he inability of the Debtor to secure insurance appears to be on
account of the lack of funds" (R. 0335).
Cook's Bankruptcy Petition claimed the company received no income in 2000, 2001
and 2002. Id. The estate could not even pay insurance for the leased premises (R. 04090422, 0331-0336). Cook's discovery responses, though somewhat at odds with its
Bankruptcy pleadings, tell the same story and demonstrate that although there may have
been some source of income, it was less than $5,000.00 annually, and not a product of
income generated due to manufacturing operations at the Lehi Plant (R. 0242).
Only after Cook's bankruptcy case was dismissed did Cook point the finger of
blame at SITLA as the cause of the company's failure. Whatever Cook's motivation, the
undisputed facts set forth in the record demonstrate that SITLA's actions did not
substantially interfere with Cook's ability to quietly enjoy its leasehold interest to conduct
the business of explosives manufacturing (R. 0537-0543). That business was dead well
before the alleged SITLA acts that that Cook complains of. Cook's claim of breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment can be dismissed as a matter of law for this reason as well.
V.
COOK'S CLAIM OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION FAILS TO IDENTIFY A
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THUS, FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION.
The District Court also found Cook's claim of inverse condemnation failed to state a
claim for a taking. Cook asserted that SITLA "has effectuated a taking as a result of its
overt actions to take away Plaintiffs leasehold interest" (R. 0289).
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Pursuant to the Utah Code, a "taking" is:
a governmental action that results in a taking of private
property so that compensation to the owner of the property is
required by: (a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States; or (b) Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 22.
Utah Code Ann. §63-90-2(1) (1997) (renumbered 2008). There is no dispute that Cook's
leasehold interest constitutes a property interest. However, under Utah law there is: (1)
no governmental action; and (2) no taking of this property interest.
Cook asserted that SITLA interfered with its reasonable investment backed
expectations and depleted the value of Cook's leasehold interest by virtue of SITLA's
attempts to raise the rent pursuant to Paragraph 11 and by the alleged "threats by STILA
(sic) since 2002 to kick Cook off the property[,] mak[ing] it very difficult to get
financing, to get investors, to get partners, and, particularly, to get customers for its
blasting products produced at the plant" (R. 0273-0274, 0276-0277). As discussed
above, Cook's leasehold interest remained intact during the course of the Lease, as did
the company's ability to conduct its business, such as it was, on the Subject Property.
Long before SITLA took any action, there simply was no business there, Cook having
gone entirely out of business.
Moreover, the claim fails due to the absence of any government action as defined
by statute. Cook alleged government action based on SITLA's position as "a state
organization" and SITLA's attempt to exercise a contract provision "to fix the rents at
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some value that does not account for the use of the property as an explosives site" (R.
0273). These acts do not constitute government action as defined by the Utah Code:
"Governmental action" or "action" does not mean. . . school
and institutional trust land management activities and disposal
of land and interests in land conducted pursuant to Title 53C,
Schools and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act.
Utah Code Ann. §63-90-2(2)(b)(iv) (1997) (renumbered 2008). The activities Cook
alleged constitute governmental action are management activities concerning the
disposition of an interest in school trust lands, which the Utah legislature has specifically
excluded from the definition of governmental action for takings purposes. Where the
basis for the inverse condemnation claim rests on an action that does not constitute
governmental action, there can be no taking.
CONCLUSION
The District Court correctly concluded that Paragraph 11 of the Lease allows
periodic readjustments of the rental rate to assure return of fair market value to the state
school trust based on the highest and best use of the land. The alternate interpretations of
Paragraph 11 advanced by Cook are not supported by the plain language of the Lease.
Since the Lease permits the adjustments contemplated by the State, Cook's derivative
claims of anticipatory repudiation, breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing
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and quiet enjoyment, and regulatory takings, were also correctly dismissed as a matter of
law. The Court of Appeals should therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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